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ABSTRACT
Data privacy is becoming one of the most critical concerns in cloud
computing. Several proposals based on Intel SGX such as VC3 [1]
andM2R [2] have been introduced in the literature to protect data
privacy during job execution in the cloud. However, a comprehen-
sive formal proof of their security guarantees is still lacking. In
this paper, we propose ObliDC, a general UC-secure SGX-based
oblivious distributed computing framework. First, we model the
life-cycle of a distributed computing job as data-flow graphs. Under
the assumption of malicious, adaptive adversaries in the cloud, we
then formally define data privacy of a distributed computing job
by introducing a notion named ODC-privacy, which encompasses
both semantic security (to protect data confidentiality during com-
putation and transmission) and oblivious traffic (to prevent data
leakage from traffic analysis). ObliDC is composed of four two-party
protocols — job deployment, job initialization, job execution, and
results return, which allow for modular construction of concrete
privacy-preserving job protocols in different distributed computing
frameworks. Finally, inspired by a formal abstraction for trusted
processors proposed by R. Pass et al. [3], we formally prove the
security of ObliDC under the universal composability (UC) frame-
work.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Distributed systems security.
KEYWORDS
oblivious computation, Intel SGX, distributed computing systems,
formal proof
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is the most popular platform for distributed com-
puting nowadays. Users can deploy various distributed computing
frameworks, e.g., MapReduce [4], Spark [5] and Storm [6], by rent-
ing virtual and scalable resources from cloud service providers. It is
unsurprising that cloud computing has drawn much attention from
the governments to industries. For example, the cloud computing
market of the U.S Federal Government has grown at a rate of 16.2%
annually from 2015-2020 and will grow up to $10 billion by 2020
[7]. Cisco forecasts that the cloud network traffic will grow from
3.9ZB in 2015 to more than 14.1ZB in 2020 [8]. Moreover, some
research institutions have been set up to devote to cloud computing
research, such as [9] and [10].
Distributed computing frameworks, deployed in a master-slave
architecture, aremost commonly used in processingmassive amount
of data in the cloud. A distributed job can be usually split into dif-
ferent tasks in phases. Upon a user providing a job request and
tasks being scheduled, networked servers (also known as worker
nodes) work cooperatively on this job. However, job-dependent data
provided by the user can be highly sensitive, and a curious cloud
service provider or a third party may try to obtain or infer user’s
privacy as follows: (1) Data exposure during task execution. After a
task being scheduled in a server, the server works on the input data
and generates task results. Even if the input data is in ciphertext
form to protect confidentiality over the network (i.e., encrypted
in AES [11] or RSA [12]), it has to be decrypted before processing,
and the decrypted data will be exposed to the server directly. (2)
Privacy inference through traffic analysis. Previous work shows that
although the content of data is encrypted, the access pattern of data
traffic can still leak sensitive information from user’s data to the
adversary [13]. For example, in the shuffle process of MapReduce,
an adversary can infer whether two key-value pairs have the same
key by observing the data traffic between a mapper and a reducer
[2]. What’s worse, if the adversary has some background knowl-
edge about the input data, it may obtain a user’s data in plaintext
by statistical inference [14].
One approach to protect data privacy in task execution is using
homomorphic encryption [15], which allows direct computation on
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ciphertexts. During task execution, the cloud is unable to learn the
underlying plaintext since data stays in encrypted form throughout
the entire task execution in servers. However, homomorphic encryp-
tion has serious limitations. Though fully homomorphic encryption
can handle arbitrary computations, it suffers from extremely high
computational and storage overhead, while semi homomorphic en-
cryption incurs much lower computational complexity, it can only
perform very limited computations [16].
Another approach for realizing secure computation is using
trusted computing technology such as Software Guard Extensions
in Intel processors (Intel SGX) [1],[2],[14],[17],[18], which allows
a program to be executed in a secure manner such that the data
and inner states of execution cannot be observed and tampered
with directly. The SGX-enabled processor creates an isolated area
in memory, called enclave, which cannot be accessed from the op-
erating system and hypervisor. SGX also provides a mechanism,
named remote attestation, to enable users to verify whether the code
has been loaded into the enclave securely and correctly. Compared
with homomorphic encryption, there are two apparent advantages
for realizing secure computation with Intel SGX processor: (1) high
performance. Previous efforts have validated that no remarkable
difference in performance between privacy preserving job execu-
tion in SGX-enabled processors and normal job execution without
any privacy protection [1]; (2) arbitrary tasks supported. Users
only need to define the sensitive code to be run in an enclave in C
language to support arbitrary computations.
Among existing SGX-based solutions, VC3 [1] is a secure dis-
tributed computing framework for MapReduce [4], which protects
data confidentiality by executing map and reduce tasks in enclaves
and by encrypting data transmitted over the network using an
IND-CPA encryption scheme [19]. Recent studies [2],[14] find that
VC3 is vulnerable to traffic analysis, wherein data privacy can be
leaked from the network-level access pattern. However, all these
existing efforts only adopt heuristic proof and semi-formal reason-
ing in their security analysis [3], and a rigorous formal security
analysis of privacy-preserving distributed computing remains an
open problem.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our goal is to bridge the gap between the design and provable
security in SGX-based secure distributed computing protocol by
presenting an Oblivious Distributed Computing (ObliDC) frame-
work which follows the paradigm of MapReduce [4] and Spark [5].
Main contributions of the paper are summarized below.
• Modular Construction of Job Protocols: Given that a job process
in distributed computing framework can be affected bymany factors
including programming paradigm [20] and system parameters (i.e.,
the input size and file block size), we need a general model which
hides the underlying factors in order to facilitate our generic design
and analysis. Hence, in ObliDC, we model the life-cycle of a job
as directed job data-flow graphs (in Section 4.1) and decompose
the life-cycle of a job in a distributed framework into four phases:
(1) Job Deployment, a user sets up a secret key with servers and
then submits job codes; (2) Job Initialization, the user uploads input
data and servers read them from the distributed storage system,
then work on it; (3) Job Execution, servers perform job codes and
transfer intermediate results with each other; and (4) Results Return,
upon completion of the tasks, the user downloads the job outputs
from the servers. Formally, ObliDC consists of four fined-grained
two-party protocols, which cover the four phases of the life-cycle
of jobs in distributed computing frameworks. Any concrete job
protocols can be instantiated based on these basic protocols.
• Resistant to Traffic Analysis: Combined with the graph model,
we identify privacy leakage due to the network-level access patterns.
Taking semantically secure encryption into consideration as well,
we summarize two security properties required in job protocols
in an indistinguishability-based security notion named Oblivious
Distributed Computation - privacy (ODC-privacy) (in Section 4.3).
Specifically, ODC-privacy encompasses both semantic security to
protect data confidentiality during computation and transmission
and oblivious traffic to prevent privacy leakage from traffic analysis.
ObliDC is designed to provide ODC-privacy and this is achieved by
proposing two privacy-enhancing preconditions: oblivious traffic
direction (by enabling the same number of data blocks to be trans-
ferred between tasks during shuffle) and oblivious traffic size (by
padding the size of each transferred block to the same length) (in
Section 4.2). Any concrete job protocols as instances of ObliDC
will inherit its security property and be able to provide semantic
security and oblivious traffic.
• Formal Description of Code Execution in Intel SGX : ObliDC splits
a job code into the sensitive code and the non-sensitive code. The
former is specific for a job while the latter is code shared among
various jobs for common functionalities such as key generation,
encryption, and decryption. Code execution process in SGX enclave
is formally defined and described in ObliDC, including code instal-
lation, remote attestation, and function invocation (see Section 5
for details).
• Formal Security Analysis in UC Framework: Previous work
demonstrates that data confidentiality in distributed computing
frameworks can be proved in games [21]. However, this proof tech-
nique is only suitable for a complete and specific protocol and is
hard to be adapted to our modular and genetic framework. Hence,
in ObliDC, we follow the universal composability (UC) framework
[22],[23], a simulation-based proof technique, in security proof.
Inspired by a formal abstraction for Intel SGX proposed by R. Pass
et al. [3], we take an SGX-enabled processor as a black-box Gatt .
To prove the security of job protocols in the UC framework, we first
provide the ideal functionality for the oblivious distributed com-
puting and demonstrate the security equivalence between the ideal
functionality and ODC-privacy (in Section 6.1). Then, we propose
the ideal functionality for each subroutine in ObliDC framework
and prove their security in the UC framework, respectively (in Sec-
tion 6.2). At last, we show a protocol instance of our framework can
be UC-secure in the hybrid model of these four ideal functionalities.
• Formal Analysis of VC3 andM2R: We apply ObliDC to formally
analyze VC3 [1] and M2R [2]. We show why a job in a secure-
shuffled VC3 andM2R can be secure in the sense of ODC-privacy.
To keep the paper compact, we leave the analysis in Appendix D.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce some necessary background knowledge. In Section 3, we
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Table 1: Summary of Notations
Notations Descriptions
Gatt a formal abstraction of a secure processor
c = Enc{k ,m } encryption of plaintextm with key k
m = Dec{k , c } decryption of ciphertext c with key k
G = (V , E) a directed graph G with vertex set V and edge set E
Gs (X )(Gs (Y )) the disjoint subset partitioned from thevertex set in a complete bipartite graph Gs
ℓ(vi , vj ) a directed edge from vi to vj
d+
G
(v) (d−
G
(v)) the inner (outer) degree of vertex v in graph G
C a constant for the traffic size
define the system model and the adversary model. In Section 4,
we discuss the job data-flow graphs model, propose preconditions
against traffic analysis and define ODC-privacy. In Section 5, we
introduce the detailed design of the ObliDC framework. We provide
formal security proof of ObliDC in the UC framework in Section 6
and evaluate the performances of ObliDC in Section 7. We survey
related work in Section 8. Finally, we conclude and discuss possible
future research directions in Section 9.
2 PRELIMINARY
In Table 1, we summarize some helpful notations used in ObliDC.
2.1 Intel SGX
Intel SGX is a CPU extension scheme for executing code security in
Intel processors [24]. To prevent from accessing and tampering with
other applications by operating system and hypervisor, Intel SGX
creates an isolated area in memory, named enclave. All messages
transmitted between CPU cache and the enclave are in an encrypted
form. Hence, the trusted computing base (TCB) only contains the
processor itself and programs defined in the enclave. After the
code having been submitted, a user can verify whether the code
is loaded securely and correctly by remote attestation. A secure
channel is then established between the user and enclave to protect
their subsequent communications.
When programming enclave applications, a user can define his
sensitive code in the .edl file. The running application is divided
into two parts: the trusted and the untrusted. The routine outside
the enclave invokes the function inside is called ECALL and the
function inside invokes the routine outside is called OCALL. For a
more detailed description about Intel SGX, the reader is referred to
[25],[26].
2.2 Universal Composability
The universal composability (UC) framework allows for modular
security analysis of complicated protocols [22]. Subroutines of a
protocol can be analyzed separately. UC ensures that a protocol
composed of UC-secure subroutines is UC-secure as well. Generally
speaking, a complicated protocol ρ calls an ideal functionality F ,
and the security properties of ρ will be retained, if replacing F by an
actual sub-protocol π realizing it. In the UC framework, a protocol is
represented as a system of probabilistic Interactive TuringMachines
(ITMs) [22],[23], where each ITM represents the program to be run
within a protocol party P. The process of executing a protocol in
the presence of an adversary A is called the real world. The ideal
world defines an ideal functionality F , which plays a role of the
Gatt [Σ,reg]
init(): //init ialization
(mpk ,msk ):=Σ.KeyGen(1λ )
T = ∅
getpk() from P: //public inter f ace
returnmpk to P
install(idx , prog) from P ∈ reg: //local inter f ace − installat ion
if P is honest, assert idx = sid
generate eid ∈ {0, 1}λ
T [eid , P] := (idx , prog, ®0)
return eid to P
resume(eid , inp) from P ∈ reg: //local inter f ace − r esume
(idx , prog,mem) := T [eid , P], abort if not found
(outp,mem) := prog(inp,mem)
T [eid , P] := (idx , prog,mem)
σ := Σ.Sigmsk (idx , eid , prog, outp)
return (outp, σ ) to P
Figure 1: The formal abstraction of secure processors Gatt
“trusted party”, and a simulator S, which operates by simulating an
execution of A. All protocol participants in the ideal world cannot
communicate with each other. The environment outside the given
protocol is defined by an environment machineZ, which provides
protocol inputs to all parties and sees their outputs. We say that a
protocol π UC-realizes F , if for any probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT ) adversariesA, there exists a PPT simulator S, such that none
PPT environmentZ is able to tell whether it contacts with π and
A in the real world or S in the ideal world. If we use c≡ to denote
the computational indistinguishability, we then have
REALπ ,A,Z
c≡ IDEALF,S,Z
2.3 Formal Abstraction for Secure Processors
R. Pass et al. [3] proposed a formal model, denoted by Gatt , for
attested execution secure processors. This allows one to study high-
level cryptographic protocol design based on secure processors.
Under the assumption that more than one program is executed in
one processor, Gatt is modeled as a global shared trusted setup
functionality in the Generalized UC (GUC) model [27], which pro-
vides a formal abstraction for common trusted processors (see Fig.
1), including
• Initialization. Upon initializing a processor, the manufacturer
M selects a signature scheme Σ, which parameterizes a pair of
secret keys (mpk ,msk) for the processor. The private keymsk is kept
in the enclave and used to sign an attestation. While the public key
mpk can be revealed to prove the identity. After parameterization,
M empties a data structure T , which is used for recording enclave
information.
•Registration. During registration of a newmachineP equipped
with a trusted processor, the registry reg records P’s identity and
some other information (i.e.,mpk of the processor in P). Machines
only in the list of reg can call enclave programs and produce attes-
tations usingmsk .
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• Public Interface. Gatt allows any parties to send requests for
the public keympk of the trusted processor. This models the process
that a processor distributes its public key to arbitrary parties during
attestation verification.
• Local Interface. Local interfaces model interactions of the
trusted processor with the local host machine P. (1) install. If
P sends an install instruction to the Gatt , a new enclave is es-
tablished binding with some identifier idx . If P is honest, idx is
identical to the session identifier of the current protocol provided
by P. Gatt then generates a unique enclave identifier eid , and
stores it with the program prog into the enclave together. Finally,
Gatt returns eid to caller P. (2) resume. Upon receiving resume
instruction, Gatt checks whether the enclave ID eid exists in data
structure T . It will abort the protocol if eid is not found. Gatt then
executes the program prog on user’s input inp, and updates the
inner state of the memorymem. The attestation σ is produced by
signing the output outp and prog usingmsk under the signature
scheme Σ. Later, outp and σ are returned to the caller P.
3 SYSTEM SETUP AND ADVERSARY MODEL
3.1 System Setup
In ObliDC, we mainly focus on how a distributed job is performed
in a privacy-preserving manner. As depicted in Fig. 2(a), the system
comprises a user and a distributed computing framework consisting
of multi servers:
• User U: The user is responsible for sending a job request and
provides inputs for servers. Before job execution, a user encrypts
the job code with a temporary key and distributes the key to the
enclave of each server over the secure channel established by the
remote attestation. After that,U encrypts the job inputs with the
temporary key again and delivers them to servers performing tasks.
After the job terminates, U downloads the results from the dis-
tributed computing framework and decrypts the results with the
temporary key.
• Distributed Computing Framework: The distributed computing
framework is deployed on a cluster of servers which are network-
connected in a specific topology. In ObliDC, each server P is
equipped with an SGX-enabled processor for securely perform-
ing a task. Moreover, P is allowed to store some job-dependent
data in local storage (i.e., disk or memory), including task inputs
and intermediate results. After a task being scheduled, P installs
user-provided code into the enclave and decrypts task inputs with
the temporary key. Before the task results leave the enclave, they
will be encrypted again and sent to other servers for further pro-
cessing1.
3.2 Adversary Model
We consider a malicious and adaptive insider adversary A (i.e.,
cloud service provider or cloud administrator), which can arbitrar-
ily deviate from the protocol specification to learn user’s sensitive
data during job execution [28]. Moreover,A can be adaptive in the
sense that it can corrupt any servers at any time. The choice of
whom and when to corrupt can be arbitrarily decided by A, and it
1Especially, if two tasks are continuously performing in the same server, a part of
intermediate results generated by the parent task will then be kept as the input for the
child task without being sent out.
depends on its view of execution [28]. A can monitor the network
communication between a user and a server, as well as between
servers. AfterA corrupting a server P, any information in software
stack outside the TCB can be accessed directly, including data on
disk or in the memory. The adversary can launch several passive
attacks to infer user’s privacy, such as ciphertext analysis to extract
input data in plaintext and traffic analysis by observing whether
two key-value pairs are shuffled to the same task [2]. What’s worse,
if A has some background knowledge about the job input such as
data distribution or frequency, it can infer more sensitive informa-
tion. The adversary can perform correlation analysis on what it
observes and the background knowledge. Previous work has shown
that A can successfully infer some individual attributes from a
census database using background knowledge [14]. For the active
attacks, we allow the adversary to abort the job protocol at any time.
Firstly, in MapReduce, the adversary can simply drop the output
of a mapper to count the value of the final output reduced, which
exposes the output of this dropped mapper. Secondly, the adversary
also can reorder or misroute intermediate results of a mapper from
an intended reducer to another, which will leak the outputs of this
mapper as well [2].
In ObliDC, we assume that the user is honest, and all tasks
are performed inside the SGX enclave as in VC3 [1] andM2R [2].
Moreover, the adversary A cannot break into the TCB, as well as
performing a denial-of-service attack, hardware attack and other
side-channel attacks (i.e., time-channel attack [2] or from memory-
level access pattern [29]) on SGX. Concretely, we consider the
provable security of the following two requirements in ObliDC:
(1) Confidentiality: All inputs and intermediate data are in en-
crypted form during transmission over the network. The
adversary is unable to extract the plaintext of these data in
polynomial time.
(2) Oblivious Traffic: The malicious adversary is unable to infer
user’s sensitive data by observing traffic pattern or taking
some active attacks (i.e., dropping tuples or misrouting data
blocks as above).
4 FORMAL COMPUTING MODEL AND
DEFINITION OF DATA PRIVACY
In this section, we first formalize the definition of the life-cycle of
a job in a distributed computing framework (Section 4.1). Before
formally define the data privacy ODC-privacy, we introduce con-
cepts of oblivious traffic direction and oblivious traffic size as two
necessary preconditions for oblivious traffic against passive and
active traffic analyses mentioned in Section 3.2.
4.1 Formal Computing Model
In ObliDC,Wemodel the life-cycle of a job in distributed computing
framework by a pair of directed graphs GI (for job deployment) and
GII (for job initialization, job execution and results return) as job
data-flow graphs based on observing a data flow exists between
two parties (including the user and servers). The graph model is
defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Job Data-flow Graphs). We assume that there
are n servers participating in a job execution. The life-cycle of a job
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1. Job Deployment
4 Results Return 
(I). User: Trusted, provides input data for the job;
(a) The life-cycle of a MapReduce Job in Cloud
(II). Adversary: Inside the cloud, takes passive attacks (i.e., ciphertext analysis, traffic analysis with 
and without background knowledge) and active attacks (i.e., tuple tampering and misrouting tuples). 
It is able to corrupt any servers at any time;
(III). Server: Equipped with trusted processors for securely performing map and reduce tasks. 
The area outside the TCB is Untrusted. After receiving task inputs from a user or other servers, 
the server executes tasks and forwards outputs to the user or other servers ;
(II). Adversary: Malicious, adaptive adversary;
(I). User: Trusted, provides input data for job protocol;
(b) Job Data-flow Graphs
FORMAL
MODELING
(III). Servers:  Have access to       , calling job code in the secure region. The output is sent back to 
user or as input for next tasks; All messages outside the TCB can be received by adversary directly.         
att
2. Job Initialization    3. Job Execution 4. Results Return 
2. Job Initialization
1. Job Deployment
3. Job Execution
Adversary
mapper reducer
𝓟𝟏 
𝓟𝟐 
𝓟𝟑 
𝓟𝟏 
𝓟𝟑 User 𝓤 
𝓤 
𝓟𝟑 
𝓟𝟐 
𝓟𝟏 
𝓤 𝓟𝟐 
𝓟𝟏 
𝓟𝟑 
𝓟𝟑 
𝓟𝟏 
𝓤 
Map Phase Reduce Phase
𝒜 
𝔾𝐈𝐈 𝔾𝐈 
Figure 2: An overview of the formal model for the life-cycle of a MapReduce job as job data-flow graphs
in distributed computing framework forms a two-tuple of directed
graphs G = {GI,GII}:
• GI = (VI, EI), where VI is a set of the user U and the enclave
on each server Pi , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. A directed edge ℓ(U,Pi ) ∈ EI
denotes a user securely delivers job codes to Pi ’s enclave.
• GII = (VII, EII), where VII is a set of the user U and the task
performed on Pi , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. A directed edge ℓ(vi ,vj ) ∈ EII
represents job-dependent data (i.e., job inputs, intermediate results
and job outputs) are transferred from vertex vi to vj . Both source and
sink points of GII are userU, which imply the user uploads inputs
and downloads outputs from the distributed computing framework.
Fig. 2(b) shows an example of job data-flow graphsG = {GI,GII}
formally modeling a real-world MapReduce job involving three
servers. Before performing the job, a user submits codes to enclaves
of these three servers as depicted in GI. The transmission of job-
dependent data during job initialization (from the user to three
mappers), job execution (from three mappers to two reducers) and
results return (from two reducers to the user) are depicted in GII.
We remark that in the job data-flow graphs, data is stored in either
the distributed storage system or local storage before loading into
enclaves, we combine this data storage/retrieval process with data
transmission and denote them as an edge in the graph.
4.2 Preconditions Against Traffic Analysis
In Section 3.2, we have discussed the privacy leakage due to traffic
analysis with and without background knowledge as well as some
active attacks. We now propose two preconditions based on the job
data-flow graphsG, namely oblivious traffic direction and oblivious
traffic size, to thwart these traffic analyses.
Oblivious Traffic Direction. During the shuffle process in a dis-
tributed computing framework, tasks in the parent phase generate
a series of key-value pairs ⟨key,value⟩. The results with the same
key are shuffled to the same child task for further processing. Due
to the fact in some jobs, some tasks in the parent phase may have
no appropriate key-value pairs as the inputs for some specific child
tasks. An adversary may infer whether some tasks performed in
the parent phase generate intermediate results with the same key.
Hence, as in some privacy-preserving solutions like Melbourne
shuffle [14] and cascaded mix network [2], tasks in the parent
phase have to send output blocks to all tasks in the child phase. In
this way, it makes the traffic direction oblivious.
Definition 2 (Oblivious Traffic Direction). In the directed
graph GII = (VII, EII) of job data-flow graphs, the shuffle process
forms a directed subgraph Gs = (Vs , Es ),Gs ⊆ GII, where Vs =
Gs (X )⋃Gs (Y ). If the traffic direction is oblivious, for allvi ∈ X ,vj ∈
Y , ℓ(vi ,vj ) ∈ Es , we then have ∀vi ∈ Gs (X ), d−Gs (vi ) = |Gs (Y )| as
well as ∀vj ∈ Y , d+Gs (vj ) = |Gs (X )|. That is to say, Gs satisfying
oblivious traffic direction is a complete bipartite graph.
Oblivious Traffic Size. Oblivious traffic direction alone is not
sufficient to completely prevent privacy leakage in the distributed
computing framework. If the adversary A has some background
knowledge on the input data, it can still infer sensitive information
by correlating actual traffic size with the background knowledge,
such as the size distribution. It is necessary that the traffic size
has to be identical for the entire process of job processing (i.e., by
padding dummy data); otherwise, A is able to distinguish two jobs
in polynomial time, as having been observed in [2] and [14]. We
hence define the oblivious traffic size in G as follows.
Definition 3 (Oblivious Traffic Size). In the directed graph
GII = (VII, EII) of job data-flow graphs, we denote the weight of an
edge ℓ(vi ,vj ) aswi , j , which represents the size of traffic from vertex
vi to vj , where vi ,vj ∈ VII. The graph GII satisfies oblivious traffic
size, if for all e ∈ EII, we havewe = C , where C is a constant.
Note that the size of a transmitted data block may depend on
system parameters. To keep all traffic size to be the same, we need
to set the constant C sufficiently large to accommodate all possible
data traffic.
4.3 Oblivious Distributed Computing - privacy
In this section, we propose Oblivious Distributed Computing - pri-
vacy (ODC-privacy), a definition of data privacy in distributed
computing frameworks. Before giving the formal definition, we
first show a security game for the oblivious traffic, which is per-
formed by a malicious, adaptive adversary A and a challenger C.
Given, A initially chooses two input datasets inp0, inp1 with equal
size. The game proceeds as follows:
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• Setup: In initialization, the challenger C fixes some frame-
work and job parameters. It randomly generates a secret key dk =
KeyGen(1λ) for encrypting the traffic data.
• Challenge: The challenger C flips a coin and samples a random
challenge bit b $← {0, 1}. It encrypts the input set inpb with the
secret key dk and stores the ciphertext in the distributed computing
framework. When the job starts to perform, the distributed comput-
ing framework ensures that traffic pattern in the entire job satisfies
the requirements of oblivious traffic direction and oblivious traffic
size by adding dummy messages and padding where necessary.
• Query: During performing the job, A is allowed to adaptively
query C in the following three issues: (1) how many servers par-
ticipate in the job; (2) what the phase of tasks server P performs;
(3) what the size of traffic transmitted between two servers and
between a user and a server. These three issues can be observed by
an inner cloud adversary, which imply some passive attacks. More-
over, A can direct C to perform the following two operations: (1)
arbitrarily drop intermediate tuples when necessary, which implies
an active drop tuple attack; (2) exchange the output traffic of two
tasks in the shuffle, which implies a data block misrouting attack;
• Guess: When the job terminates, A constructs job data-flow
graphs Gb based on C’s replies and outputs a bit b ′ to guess b. If
b ′ = b, we say that the game outputs true, and otherwise it outputs
false.
Now we propose the definition of ODC-privacy:
Definition 4 (ODC-privacy). The life-cycle of a job in distributed
computing framework as defined in Section 4 is ODC-privacy, if the
following two properties are satisfied for any negligible function negl(),
and all large enough values of the security parameter λ:
• Semantic security: For any two messages m0,m1 of equal
length, randomly choose one bit b from {0, 1}, c = Enc{k,mb }. The
advantage of a PPT adversary A successfully guess which message is
encrypted is less than negl(λ).
• Oblivious traffic: For all PPT adversaries, the advantage of
winning the oblivious traffic game defined above, |Pr[b ′ = b] − 1/2|
is less than negl(λ).
5 OBLIDC: SGX-BASED OBLIVIOUS
DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING FRAMEWORK
5.1 Design Details of ObliDC
In this section, we propose the oblivious distributed computing
(ObliDC) framework based on Intel SGX (in Fig. 3). The framework
consists of four subroutines π JD , π J I , π JE , πRR , and each of them
is described as a two-party protocol. π JD enables a user U to
communicate with each server P to deploy the job code. π J I allows
the user U to upload input blocks to each task in the first phase.
π JE carries out a job execution, to allow one task (vi ) sending its
outputs to another task (vj ) for further processing, denoted by an
edge ℓ(vi ,vj ) ∈ GII. πRR , after the last phase tasks are finished,
allowsU to download the job outputs from the servers.
The ObliDC framework is designed to resist against passive and
active attacks mentioned in Section 3.2. To counter ciphertext anal-
ysis, ObliDC uses either asymmetric or symmetric IND-CPA encryp-
tion schemes [19],[30]. Moreover, before data encryption, a hash
value is appended to the plaintext to thwart malicious tampering by
progπ [job , U, P1, . . . , Pn ]
code+ : On input (“PKGen”): (pk , sk) ← PKE.GEN(1λ ); return pk
On input (“Encrypt”, pt , k ): ct = Enc{k , pt }; return ct
On input (“Decrypt”, ct , k ): pt = Dec{k , ct }; return pt
code− : On input (“Compute”, d , y): if y , ⊥, return y ; else d = d − dummy ,
outp = f (d ), outp = outp + dummy ; return outp
Protπ [job , G = {GI, GII }, U, P1, . . . , Pn ,C]
Job Deployment π JD : for each ℓ(U, Pi ) ∈ GI, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n }:
C: dk = KeyGen(1λ );
Ccode = Enc{dk , code− };
sends the Ccode and code+ to P;
P: eid = install(sid , code+);
henceforth let Gatt .resume(·) = Gatt .resume(eid , ·);
(pk , σ ) = Gatt .resume(“PKGen”);
sends the (pk , σ ) to C;
C: assert Σ.Vermpk {σ };
Ckey = Enc{pk , dk };
sends the Ckey to P;
P: dk = Gatt .resume(“Decrypt”, Ckey , sk);
code− = Gatt .resume(“Decrypt”, Ccode , dk );
sends “okay” to C;
Job Initialization π J I : for each ℓ(U, v) ∈ GII, v ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }:
C: If the size of d is less than C , d = d + dummy, d ∈ inp ;
Cd = Enc{dk , d };
sends Cd to v ;
v : d = Gatt .resume(“Decrypt”,Cd , dk );
({outpk }k∈[ψ ]) = Gatt .resume(“Compute”, d , ⊥), whereψ = d−GII (v);
Job Execution π J E : for each ℓ(vi , vj ) ∈ GII , vi , vj ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }:
If ℓ(vi , vj ) ∈ Gs , Gs ⊆ GII , we must have d−Gs (vi ) = |Gs (Y ) | and d+Gs (vj )
= |Gs (X ) |.
vi : Cd = Gatt .resume(“Encrypt”, d , dk );
sends the Cd to vj ;
vj : await φ input data Cdi , i ∈ [φ], where φ = d+GII (vj );
di = Gatt .resume(“Decrypt”,Cdi , dk );
({outpk }k∈[ψ ]) = Gatt .resume(“Compute”, {di }i∈[φ ], ⊥), where
ψ = d−
GII
(vj );
Results Return πRR : for each ℓ(v , U) ∈ GII, v ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }:
v : Cd = Gatt .resume(“Encrypt”, d , dk );
sends the Cd to C;
C: d = Dec{dk ,Cd }, d ∈ outp ;
Figure 3: Oblivious distributed computing (ObliDC) frame-
work
the adversary over the network. To against traffic analyses, ObliDC
ensures its data shuffle satisfies both oblivious traffic direction and
oblivious traffic size. That is, the framework guarantees that the
outer degree of vertexes in Gs (X ) is identical to |Gs (Y )|, and the
inner degree of vertexes in Gs (Y ) is identical to |Gs (X )|. Before job
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Figure 4: Modular construction for a real-world privacy-
preservingMapReduce job protocol with threemappers and
two reducers using ObliDC framework
execution, a constantC is chosen, and all data blocks in the network
are padded to lengthC . If we encrypt these blocks in a semantically
secure encryption scheme, the adversary can only distinguish two
blocks from their ciphertexts with negligible probability.
A job code in ObliDC is divided into two parts: code− and code+.
The former is the sensitive job code without being exposed, while
the latter is the public shared code for each job including the public
key generation PKE.GEN(·), encryption and decryption scheme
Enc{k, ·},Dec{k, ·}. Functions of the four subroutines are described
as follows:
• Job Deployment π JD : For each server P participating in a
job, the userU generates a symmetric key dk for encrypting the
sensitive data and code in authenticated encryption scheme (i.e.,
AES-GCM [31]). The code− in ciphertext and the public code code+
are then sent to P. After receiving codes fromU, P first installs
code+ into the enclave and calls the PKGen(·) function to generate
a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk) for securely delivering dk .
The private key sk is kept in the isolated area, and the public key
pk as well as the signature σ signed with Gatt ’s private keymsk
are returned toU as a remote attestation (see Fig. 1 in detail).U
verifies the correctness of σ using the Gatt ’s public keympk . If it
succeed,U encrypts the symmetric key dk with pk and sends the
Ckey to P’s enclave. P decrypts the ciphertext with sk first to get
the symmetric key dk , and then decrypts Ccode with dk to get the
sensitive job code code−.
• Job Initialization π J I : For each taskv in the first phase, the data
block d as input is padded to the constant size C byU if necessary.
d is then encrypted with dk and sent to P’s enclave. v decrypts the
data block by calling Gatt . It removes any dummy data and then
executes a function f on this input. After finishing the task, the
enclave pads each output block of f to the constant size C for all
tasks in the next phase.
• Job Execution π JE : Recall that an edge ℓ(vi ,vj ) in the graph
GII represents the existence of a traffic transmission from vi to vj
in which vi encrypts one of vj ’s input blocks d (the outp of vi ) in
the enclave and delivers it to vj , and vj decrypts it and calls the
sensitive code code− as in job initialization. Note that a complicated
job may consist of many phases of tasks; hence the process that
intermediate results generated by tasks are sent to other tasks for
further processing may repeat multiple times. From this point of
view, a complicated execution process can be divided into multiple
π JE protocols.
• Results Return πRR : For each task performed in the last phase,
after the job is finished, the userU downloads the job outputs from
the server P where task v is performed and decrypts it with the
symmetric key dk .
Design of Backdoors in ObliDC. In ObliDC, we adopt two proof
techniques in the UC framework. The first is extraction. In an at-
tested execution secure processor, we plant a backdoor in the en-
clave program to allow S to extract the real inputs of corrupted
servers. We assume that each server has a special “label”. When
S provides the correct label of a server, the enclave program will
leak the real inputs of this server. However, this technique is not
harmful to the security of honest servers, because no one learns
honest parties’ labels, including the honest parties themselves. The
second is named equivocation, which plants a backdoor in Gatt to
enable the simulator S to sign on any data it needs during simu-
lation. Recall that in the UC framework, the simulator S has no
idea about the inputs of an honest server. It has to choose a canon-
ical one and send to Gatt on behalf of this server. While in the
real world, the environment Z provides honest servers the real
inputs. After the simulation terminates, the ideal functionality F
evaluates on the canonical input provided by S and generates a
false output, which can be different from the correct output outp
in the real world. Moreover, S is unable to sign and modify Gatt ’s
signature because the private keymsk is never revealed in public.
This can be dangerous because it helpsZ to distinguish the ideal
world from the real world. To make the simulation successful, we
enable the simulator S to program messages between a corrupt
server andGatt by planting a trapdoory inside the enclave program
(“compute”,d,y). If the trapdoor is ⊥, it will compute on the input
block d and generate a real output outp. Otherwise, Gatt signs on
y and returns y directly. This allows S to sign on any data it needs
during simulation. Similar to the extraction technique, equivoca-
tion will not do harm to an honest server’s security, because the
trapdoor y is always ⊥ in functions called by honest servers.
5.2 Modular constructions for concrete job
protocols
The basic two-party protocols provided by ObliDC can be used to
construct concrete privacy-preserving job protocols in distributed
computing frameworks. For example, Fig. 4 shows a protocol in-
stance of ObliDC. In this instance, three servers participate in per-
forming a job. In job deployment,U communicates with all servers
to distribute the job code and the symmetric key, which performs
π JD three times. That is, the real-world privacy-preserving job
deployment protocol consists of three instances of π JD . Similarly,
in job initialization,U communicates with three tasks to be per-
formed in the first phase, which means it has three instances of π J I .
During the shuffle process, because ObliDC framework is required
to satisfy oblivious traffic direction, all tasks in the parent phase
send data blocks to all tasks in the child phase. Hence, the real-
world protocol has 3 × 2 = 6 instances of π JE . For results return, it
is obvious that the protocol contains two instances of πRR .
Some security solutions for MapReduce (i.e., [2],[14]) also con-
sider privacy leakage in network-level access pattern. In these pre-
vious works, all data blocks transmitted in the network are padded
to the same size. For example, in [14], all mappers deliver interme-
diate results to all reducers to achieve oblivious traffic direction. In
[2], similarly, all mappers send intermediate results to all mixers
Session 2A: SGX-based Security AsiaCCS ’19, July 9–12, 2019, Auckland, New Zealand
92
Fπ [sid , G = {GI, GII }, U, P1, . . . , Pn ,C]
Job Deployment: for each ℓ(U, Pi ) ∈ GI, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n }
Upon receiving code− from U:
notify S, A of |code− | and store code− ;
send code− to P;
send a public delayed output “okay” to U;
Job Initialization: for each ℓ(U, v) ∈ GII, v ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }
Upon receiving d from C:
notify S, A of C ;
compute on d , ({outpk }k∈[ψ ]) = f (d ), whereψ = d−GII (v);
send {outpk }k∈[ψ ] toψ subsequent tasks, respectively;
Job Execution: for each ℓ(vi , vj ) ∈ GII, vi , vj ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }
Upon receiving d from vi :
await {di }i∈[φ−1] from vj , where d+GII (vj ) = φ ;
if receive the number of input from vj less than φ − 1 then
abort execution;
notify S, A of C ;
compute on φ input blocks, ({outpk }k∈[ψ ]) = f (d , {di }i∈[φ−1]), where
ψ = d−
GII
(vj );
send {outpk }k∈[ψ ] toψ subsequent tasks, respectively;
Results Return: for each ℓ(v , U) ∈ GII, v ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }
Upon receiving d from v :
notify S, A of C ;
send a delayed output d to C;
FJD [sid , U, P]
Upon receiving code− from U:
notify S, A of |code− |;
send code− to P;
send a public delayed output “okay” to U;
FJ I [sid , U, v]
Upon receiving d from C:
notify S, A of |d |;
compute on d , ({outpk }k∈[r ]) = f (d ), where r is the number of blocks sent by
v in total in the real world;
send {outpk }k∈[r ] to r subsequent tasks, respectively;
FJ E [sid , vi , vj ]
Upon receiving d from vi , vi ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }:
await {di }i∈[t−1] from vj , where t is the number of blocks received by vj in
total in the real world;
notify S, A of |d |;
compute on t input blocks, ({outpk }k∈[r ]) = f (d , {di }i∈[t−1]), where r is the
number of blocks sent by vj in total in the real world;
send {outpk }k∈[r ] to r subsequent tasks, respectively;
FRR [sid , U, v]
Upon receiving d from v , v ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn }:
notify S, A of |d |;
send a delayed output d to U;
Figure 5: Ideal functionalities of oblivious distributed computing and four subroutines in the ObliDC framework
first, and mixers then send permuted results to all reducers, which
satisfies oblivious traffic direction as well. ObliDC is motivated by
these previous efforts and can be regarded as a generic privacy-
preserving distributed computing framework based on Intel SGX.
Following this idea, more security solutions can be proposed in
other frameworks, such as Microsoft Dryad [32] and Apache Tez
[33].
5.3 Correctness of ObliDC
Theorem 1. Assuming that both code+ and code− are programmed
correctly, and Gatt properly performs these codes, then a protocol in-
stance of the ObliDC framework, π generates a correct output under
the passive attacks.
Proof. Based on the observation that an adversary performing
passive attacks who does not disrupt the operation of the ObliDC
framework in any way, the proof is trivial, and we omitted here. 
6 FORMAL PROOF OF OBLIDC IN THE UC
FRAMEWORK
In this section, we formally prove the security of a protocol in-
stance π of the ObliDC framework. We first introduce the ideal
functionality Fπ for oblivious distributed computing and prove the
security equivalence of Fπ andODC-privacy (Section 6.1). We then
present ideal functionalities of four subroutines in ObliDC, denoted
as FJD , FJ I , FJE , FRR , and prove each of them can be UC-realized
by the corresponding subroutine, respectively (Section 6.2). Finally,
we demonstrate that the protocol π is able to UC-realize Fπ in
(FJD , FJ I , FJE , FRR )-hybrid model2.
6.1 Security Equivalence of Fπ and
ODC-privacy
The ideal functionality Fπ for oblivious distributed computation
is shown in Fig. 5, which is partitioned into four phases. In job
deployment, for each server P, upon receiving code− from the user
U, Fπ notifies the size of code to S and A. After that, it stores
the job code and returns “okay” toU. In job initialization, for each
task v in the first phase, after receiving one input block d fromU,
Fπ sends S and A the fake size of d — the constant C to satisfy
oblivious traffic size. Output blocks outp1, . . . ,outpψ are later sent
to otherψ units respectively, whereψ is equal to the outer degree
2We note that in some distributed computing frameworks, it is possible for some
protocols to have tasks in only one phase. Hence, these protocols can only be
composed by π JD , π J I , πRR three subroutines, and the security will be proved in
(FJD , FJ I , FRR )-hybrid model. In this case, Fπ will be re-designed as well. In this
paper, for the generality, we choose more complicated protocols with tasks in more
than one phase.
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of v in GII. In job execution, for each data traffic between two tasks
vi and vj , upon receiving an input block from vi , Fπ needs to wait
for other φ − 1 input blocks from vj , where φ is the inner degree
of vj in GII. If the number of input blocks Fπ receiving from vj is
less than φ − 1, Fπ will abort execution, which is directed by the
oblivious traffic direction. Otherwise, Fπ continues to compute on
total φ input blocks and it notifies A and S the constant C . The
same-sized output blocks will later be sent to tasks in the next
phase, which number is identical to the outer degree of vj . Finally,
in the result return, upon receiving an input block d from the task
v , Fπ simply notifies S andA the constantC as the block size and
delivers d toU. We have
Theorem 2. A job protocol π in the distributed computing frame-
work UC-realizes Fπ if and only if π is ODC-privacy.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A.
6.2 Security of Subroutines in ObliDC
The four ideal functionalities FJD , FJ I , FJE , FRR for the four sub-
routines of ObliDC are shown in Fig. 5. After receiving the job code
code− fromU, FJD directly delivers it to P, notifies S and A the
code size, and returns “okay” toU. For FJ I , upon receiving a input
block d from the user, it tells S and A of the size of d and per-
forms the task on d . The output blocks are later sent to r following
tasks respectively. Note that a real-world job protocol always can
be executed regardless of whether it is oblivious traffic direction.
Hence, r here can be flexible and acceptable for a different number
of input blocks in the real world without the restriction ofψ blocks
in oblivious traffic direction. That is to say, r is possible to be any
numbers less thanψ . For the ideal functionality of the job execution
FJE , upon receiving an input block d from vi , it has to wait other
t − 1 blocks fromvj . Similarly, t is also dependent on the real-world
execution and can be less than φ in Fπ . FJE then works on these t
input blocks and transfers r output blocks to r units respectively.
For the last ideal functionality FRR , upon receiving an input block
d , FRR simply tells S and A the size of the block and delivers d
to U. In the following, we demonstrate that each subroutine is
UC-secure in their corresponding ideal functionality. We have
Theorem 3. Assuming all data transmission outside the TCB is
encrypted in an authenticated encryption scheme, and the scheme
is semantically secure, then the protocol πα ∈ {π JD , π J I , π JE , πRR }
UC-realizes Fα in the presence of a malicious, adaptive adversary A.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix B.
6.3 Security of Protocol Instance of ObliDC
In this section, we demonstrate the security of a real-world privacy-
preserving job protocol π in distributed computing framework.
First, we have
Theorem 4. Let π = (π JD , π J I , π JE , πRR ) be a protocol instance
of ObliDC framework. Each subroutine ξ inside π UC-realizes its
corresponding ideal functionality Fξ . We say that if π UC-realizes
Fπ , the composed protocol π ξ /Fξ UC-realizes Fπ as well, where
π ξ /Fξ represents replacing an ideal functionality Fξ called by Fπ
with a real protocol ξ UC-realizing Fξ .
Table 2: Summary of applications used in evaluatingObliDC
Application LOC (code−) Size of enclave(mapper + reducer)
Matrix Calculation 75 325KB + 331KB
K-means 117 375KB + 330KB
Monte Carlo Simulation 133 374KB + 330KB
WordCount 173 330KB + 331KB
RandomWriter 167 325KB + 331KB
Float-point Calculation 85 325KB + 330KB
Proof. This theorem can be demonstrated from universal com-
posability directly. 
we now prove the distributed job protocol π UC-realizes Fπ in
(FJD , FJ I , FJE , FRR )-hybrid model.
Theorem 5. If all data transmission outside the TCB is encrypted
in an authenticated encryption scheme, and the scheme is semantically
secure, then the protocol π as an instance of ObliDC framework UC-
realizes Fπ in (FJD , FJ I , FJE , FRR )-hybrid model with the presence
of a malicious, adaptive adversary A. That is,
REALπ ,A,Z
c≡ IDEALFπ ,S,Z
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix C.
7 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
To assess the efficiency of ObliDC, we realize the framework in
MapReduce and compare its performance with the original MapRe-
duce in several applications. These applications are listed in Table
2.
ObliDC inMapReduce andApplications. To be compatiblewith
the SGX code in C language, wemeasure the performance of ObliDC
on Hadoop Streaming. We choose six real-world applications and
realize them using version 2.1 Intel SGX SDK [26]. For applications
realized in Intel SGX, we define sensitive job code code− in the
.edl file, and all data blocks in the network are encrypted using
AES-GCM (we use AES-NI instructions to implement the encryp-
tion scheme). Before showing our results, we first briefly introduce
each application:
(1) Matrix Calculation: Randomly choose two large matrices
with the same dimension and calculate their product. Each
element in both matrices ranges from 100 to 1000.
(2) K-means: Randomly choose a series of points (x,y) as sam-
ples in the Cartesian coordinate system. Given the number
of clusters and iterations, make clusters for these points. We
use Euclidean distance in the calculation.
(3) Monte Carlo Simulation: Randomly choose a series of points
(x,y) as samples in a 2×2 square in the Cartesian coordinate
system. Count the number of points resident in the unit
circle and statistically estimate the value of Pi.
(4) WordCount: Count the number of occurrences for each word
in a text set.
(5) RandomWriter: Randomly generate a sequence of strings
with a predefined length.
(6) Float-point Calculation: For each sample, randomly generate
two decimal numbers with four places and perform their
addition and multiplication once respectively.
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Figure 6: Comparison of execution time of applications run-
ning in ObliDC and in the original MapReduce
Experimental Setup. We perform our experiments on a server
equipped with 3.00GHz Intel Xeon E3-1220 v6 CPU, 16GB RAM
and, 100GB disk. We create a cluster with ten virtual machines
as worker nodes, and each of them is under Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
operation system. The Hadoop version we use is 2.7.2.
Comparison in Different Applications. As shown in Fig. 6, in
these six applications, jobs performed in ObliDC have stable run-
ning time, with overheads between 33%-110% over the original
MapReduce. The overhead is mainly due to three factors: (1) En-
cryption and decryption in the enclave. After reading task input
into the secure region, mappers and reducers have to decrypt first.
Before task results leaving from the enclave, they are encrypted
again to keep confidentiality. Moreover, all data in the enclave are
also encrypted by Memory Encryption Engine (MEE). Before exe-
cuting CPU instructions and accessing the encrypted memory in
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Figure 7: Normalized running time in phases of job for ap-
plications realized in ObliDC and original MapReduce (for
each application, the left bar shows the normalized time in
ObliDC and the right bar is in original MapReduce)
an enclave, the processor has to decrypt these data first; (2) Context
switching and enclave transitions. During entering and exiting an
enclave (performing ECALL and OCALL functions), CPU has to load
contents from memory into the cache, and it will lead to a perfor-
mance impact. Similarly, the system interrupt is another reason
leading to a performance reduction. If it happens, OS has to store
all program states at the breakpoint and recover these states before
performing the program again; (3) Oblivious shuffle for a large
number of intermediate results. To hide the traffic access pattern of
the shuffle, ObliDC produces extra dummy messages and the size of
intermediate results are larger than in original MapReduce, both of
which will bring more overheads because the real mapper outputs
have to take a long time before been transferred to the reducer.
From the entire job running time, it also can be seen that the
overheads in some IO-intensive applications (i.e., WordCount and
RandomWriter) are more apparent than other CPU-intensive ap-
plications. In WordCount and RandomWriter, massive interme-
diate results have to be encrypted and padded to the same size.
Before performing reduce tasks, all dummy data has to be removed
again, which takes a long time (e.g., about 27s in WordCount and
44s in RandomWriter). While in CPU-intensive applications, the
overheads can be much lower because these applications normally
generate fewer intermediate results (e.g., mappers in Monte Carlo
Simulation only output several numbers, which bring 4s overheads
merely).
Overheads in Job Phases. As depicted in Fig. 7, we observe that
the oblivious shuffle (including oblivious traffic direction and obliv-
ious traffic size) using in ObliDC is significant, especially in IO-
intensive jobs. The overhead is up to 40.4% inWordCount and 50.1%
in RandomWriter. The cost primarily due to the privacy-preserving
shuffle of a large amount of data. We have to choose a significant
large constant number as the traffic size to accommodate all net-
work traffic. While in some CPU-intensive jobs, such as K-means,
Monte Carlo Simulation and Float-point Calculation, the overheads
in shuffle are much lower because of their few map task outputs,
which only between 23.7%-27.6% over the entire running time.More-
over, in these CPU-intensive applications, the costs of mappers and
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Table 3: Comparison of distributed computing security so-
lutions
Security Solutions Against network-levelaccess pattern
Genetic
framework
Formally Proved
in ObliDC
Haven [18] × X ×
VC3 [1] × × X
M2R [2] X × X
Ohrimenko et al. [14] X × X
Opaque [17] X × ×
ObliDC X X X
reducers in enclave are relatively larger than that of the oblivious
shuffle. The second observation is that compared with applications
realized in original MapReduce, shuffle processes of ones realized
in ObliDC take more time, which ranges from 1.03× to 1.51× as the
insecure shuffle. As having analyzed before, oblivious shuffle used
in ObliDC generates a large amount of dummy data to hide the
network traffic access pattern. Both traffic direction and traffic size
are oblivious under the conditions of traffic padding. Thus, it takes
more time to shuffle intermediate results than original MapReduce.
8 RELATEDWORK
Haven [18] is the first to propose combining Intel SGX with the
untrusted cloud. Before executing the program, Haven has to load
the whole Windows 8 OS library into an enclave, which makes a
large TCB. Moreover, the system cannot guarantee data integrity
during computation in the cloud. VC3 [1] is another SGX-based
secure system designed on Hadoop MapReduce. Instead of loading
the whole OS library into the enclave as Haven, VC3 only keeps
sensitive code and data in the TCB. Verifiers in VC3 guarantee all
outputs from the tasks (or users) are not modified in the network,
which protects data integrity. However, although all messages are
encrypted in the network, VC3 is unable to protect against pri-
vacy leakage from network-level access patterns [13]. M2R is a
privacy-enhanced system based on VC3, which modifies the shuffle
process in cascaded mix network [34]. Ohrimenko et al.[14] also
find VC3 insecure during shuffling and improves its security by
Melbourne shuffle [35]. However, bothM2R and VC3 only focus on
the MapReduce framework and the shuffle process instead of the
genetic framework and the life-cycle of the job in ObliDC. Opaque
[17] is a security system based on Spark SQL. It protects data pri-
vacy from both network and memory level access pattern. The
system rewrites some operators in Spark SQL to make access pat-
tern oblivious during enclave computing. All these existing efforts
have not provided rigorous formal security proofs for their systems.
A comparison of previous distributed computing security solutions
and ObliDC is given in Table 3.
Some other works are devoted to formalizing trusted processor.
Considering trusted processors like Intel SGX are hard to prevent
from side-channel attacks, Tramèr et al. [36] propose a new model
for trusted processors, named transparent enclave, in which all se-
crets and states of the application in the enclave are revealed to
the adversary during execution. They also show that some security
protocols such as commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs
can be realized with transplant enclave. Similarly, Pass et al. [3]
propose a formal abstraction for genetic trusted processor Gatt . In-
stead of revealing inner states to adversary like transplant enclave,
Gatt keeps all sensitive information inside the enclave such as se-
cret keymsk . During formal proofs in GUC framework, Gatt works
as a global trusted setup functionality, which makes it sharable by
many protocols. While in transplant enclave, the setup is assumed
to be “local” and some enclave information like master keys cannot
be reused in protocols. ObliDC allows enclave to create attestations
for more jobs with a single private key, hence we choose Gatt in
our proofs. Unlike our work, both of these previous work study
some common secure computation protocols instead of focusing on
a specific application framework, such as distributed computation.
We take Gatt as a primitive during formal proofs, and further pro-
pose a model of distributed computing framework and a general
privacy-preserving framework. Subramanyan et al. [37] propose a
formal verification method for trusted hardware platforms. Instead
of proving the security of protocols as mentioned above, they focus
on program execution inside the enclave. They show how to prove
the security of remote attestation and how a trusted hardware plat-
form satisfies integrity, confidentiality, and secure measurement.
The differences are that they focus on trusted hardware platforms
instead of distributed computing frameworks, and they only care
about inner-enclave security and some security mechanisms of the
trusted processor, while the security of job protocols takes center
stage in our work.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we proposed an oblivious distributed computing
framework, named ObliDC, which allows for modular construc-
tion of job protocols in distributed computing based on Intel SGX
with provable security in the UC framework. We first modeled the
life-cycle of a job as job data-flow graphs by the data transmission
between a user and a task as well as between tasks. In this graph
model, to prevent traffic analysis, we proposed two preconditions:
oblivious traffic direction and oblivious traffic size, as countermea-
sures. We further formally defined the notion of data privacy in
distributed computation, named ODC-privacy. Operations of the
life-cycle of a job are specified by four subroutines in the ObliDC
framework, which are designed to satisfy ODC-privacy. Inspired
by Gatt [3], a formal abstraction for the trusted processor, we for-
mally proved the security of the four subroutines and that of the
job protocol π composed of the four subroutines in the presence of
adaptive adversaries. As applications of ObliDC, we provided for-
mal security proofs of VC3 [1] andM2R [2]. In ObliDC, we mainly
considered the scenarios in distributed computation. While in other
fields like anonymous communications, some systems are proposed
with the help of Intel SGX as well, such as SGX-Tor [38]. It will
be interesting to adapt our ObliDC framework to other fields and
formally prove their security.
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A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Theorem 2 Revisited. A job protocol π in the distributed com-
puting framework UC-realizes Fπ if and only if π is ODC-privacy.
Proof. For the “only if” direction, assuming π is not ODC-
privacy, we show that it is unable to UC-realize Fπ . This can be
done by constructing an environment machineZ and an adversary
A in the real world. For any PPT simulator S,Z can distinguish
whether it is dealing with π and A in the real world or S and Fπ
in the ideal world. We discuss in the following two cases:
1) π is not semantically secure. Given the ciphertext of a mes-
sagem in the network, let |m | denote the message length. In the
ideal world, upon a receiving a message, Fπ sends the length of
the message to the simulator S, which is the only information ob-
tained by S about the message. Hence, |m | is a part of S’s view and
is written to S’s output tape. Formally, let IDEALFπS (λ, inp) and
REALπA (λ, inp) denote the view of S and A in the ideal and real
world, respectively, and we further have |m | ∈ IDEALFπS (λ, inp).
However, in the real world, if a message in π is not encrypted by
a semantically secure encryption scheme, then a PPT adversary
A can exist who can extract more information aboutm, and we
denoted bym′. Then both |m | andm′ are written to the output tape
ofA, i.e., |m |,m′ ∈ REALπA (λ, inp). Hence,Z is able to distinguish
the ideal world and the real world from the views of S andA with
a non-negligible probability.
2) π is not oblivious traffic. In this case, the adversary A is able
to distinguish whether Gb is G0 or G1 in the polynomial time as
follows:
• Difference in Graph Structure. For a given job and fixed system
parameters, assuming that sizes of two inputs inp0 and inp1 are
equal but π does not satisfy oblivious traffic direction, we then
have ∃Gs ⊆ Gb , where ∃vi ∈ Gs (X ), ∃vj ∈ Gs (Y ), ℓ(vi ,vj ) <
E. In other words, ∃vi ∈ Gs (X ),d−Gs (vi ) < |Gs (Y )| and ∃vj ∈
Gs (Y ),d+Gs (vj ) < |Gs (X )|. For a data flow ℓ(vi ,vj ) in the shuffle
process of π , if the taskvi makes output blocks less than |Gs (Y )|,vj
will receive input blocks less than |Gs (X )|. In the ideal world,S sim-
ulates the operation of the real world only if it providesφ = |Gs (X )|
input blocks to Fπ . Otherwise, the simulation won’t be continue.
However, in the real world, π always can execute regardless of
the number of input blocks, which makes a difference to the ideal
world and helpsZ distinguish these two worlds. Moreover, traffic
analysis in the real world can help A extract more information
than S. Thus, in this issue, Z can tell whether it is dealing with
the ideal world or the real world.
Session 2A: SGX-based Security AsiaCCS ’19, July 9–12, 2019, Auckland, New Zealand
97
• Difference in Edge Weights. It is apparent that A will distin-
guish G0 and G1 based on weights of edges if π is not oblivious
traffic size. In the ideal world, the ideal functionality Fπ always
pads the size of data blocks to the constant C before transmit-
ting. While in the real world, if π is not oblivious traffic size,
the size of some block can be less than C . Therefore, we have
∃|m | ∈ IDEALFπS (λ, inp), ∃|m′ | ∈ REALπA (λ, inp), |m | , |m′ |. If A
has some background knowledge, it can infer more information
than S in the ideal world. This difference in output tapes of A and
S allowsZ to distinguish the ideal world and the real world.
For the “if” direction, assume that π does not UC-realize Fπ ,
then it is not ODC-privacy. In this case, a PPT Z exists, which can
distinguish transcripts of S and A generated in the ideal world
and the real world, respectively. During the simulation of π , S
only receives block size from Fπ in the ideal world, while A can
extract extra information in the following three ways. Firstly, after
intercepting an encrypted data block, if the encryption scheme is
not semantically secure, A can infer more information other than
the block size. Secondly, in the ideal world, Fπ can continue its
work only if it has received φ input blocks. If it fails, π will not
be UC-secure any more, which makes a chance for A to perform
traffic analyze to learn more privacy. Finally, if A can distinguish
G0 and G1 by observing the size of data traffic over the network,
then more information is written to the output tape of A if it has
some background knowledge about the input data, and π does not
satisfy oblivious traffic size required in oblivious traffic. 
B PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Theorem 3 Revisited. Assuming all data transmission outside
the TCB is encrypted in an authenticated encryption scheme, and the
scheme is semantically secure, then the protocol πα ∈ {π JD , π J I , π JE , πRR }
UC-realizes Fα in the presence of a malicious, adaptive adversary A.
Proof. Here, we demonstrate the subroutine π JE can UC-realize
FJE as an example. Proofs of other subroutines are similar, and we
omit here. We assume that any communication betweenZ and A
or between A and Gatt is simply forwarded to S. According to
the communication process between vi and vj , we discuss in the
following four cases and construct S for each of them:
• Case 1: vi is honest before sending Cd and vj is honest when
receives Cd . In this case, both of vi and vj are honest during π JE
execution and S will perform operations on behalf of them. First,
S generates a canonical data block d ′ for vi in the ideal world
and sends it to FJE as an input. After S calling (“Encrypt”,d ′,dk)
in the real world, vj is honest as well. S then generates other
φ − 1 canonical input blocks for vj and delivers all of them to FJE .
After all of the blocks having prepared, FJE works on φ blocks and
generates a result outp. The indistinguishability proof of this case is
trivial as all communication between vi and vj is assumed to occur
over secure channels. The eavesdropper only extracts the length of
a message transmitted in the channel. In this case, the simulated
operation of S is identically distributed as the real execution in
case 1.
• Case 2:vi is honest before sendingCd tovj andvj is corrupt when
receives Cd . Similar to the case 1 except that Z provides another
φ − 1 input blocks for vj instead of S. Moreover, in case 2, A calls
the function (“Decrypt”,Cd ,dk) to decrypt the input block forvj in
enclave instead of S. If A makes a call (“Compute”, {di }i ∈[φ],⊥),
S will extract all real inputs by the extract trapdoor in the enclave
program and delivers them to FJE . After the ideal functionality FJE
generating outp, S replaces the message (“Compute”, {di }i ∈[φ],⊥)
fromA to Gatt with (“Compute”, {di }i ∈[φ],outp) by equivocation
backdoor, and forwards the response (outp,σ ) toA. Because of the
restriction of oblivious traffic direction and oblivious traffic size,
the adversary A receives the identical number of messages as the
simulator S in the ideal world. Additionally, all data blocks are
encrypted in semantically secure encryption scheme, which leads
to bothA and S only know the constant block lengthC . Hence, the
views of A and S are indistinguishable for taking passive attacks.
For the active attacks, althoughA is able to exchange block traffics
from two tasks during shuffle, this will not help it extract more
information because π JE satisfies both two preconditions perfectly.
While in the ideal world, S forwards all extracted input blocks
to FJE , which outputs the same result outp as the real world. If
A arbitrarily drops one data block in shuffle, S will simply drops
the corresponding block in the ideal world, which makes the same
result as well. Based on these analyses, no matter A takes passive
or active attacks, S will perfectly simulate its operations, and views
of them are indistinguishable in polynomial time.
• For another two cases: Case 3:vi is corrupt before sendingCd to
vj and vj is honest when receives Cd as well as Case 4: vi is corrupt
before sendingCd tovj andvj is corrupt when receivesCd are similar
to the case 2 above. The security of π JE in both cases can be reduced
to the semantic security of encryption scheme and oblivious traffic
as well. We omit them for the brevity. 
C PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Theorem 5 Revisited. If all data transmission outside the TCB
is encrypted in an authenticated encryption scheme, and the scheme
is semantically secure, then the protocol π as an instance of ObliDC
framework UC-realizes Fπ in (FJD , FJ I , FJE , FRR )-hybrid model
with the presence of a malicious, adaptive adversary A. That is,
REALπ ,A,Z
c≡ IDEALFπ ,S,Z
Proof. We construct a simulator S for Fπ in the ideal world. It
works as follows:
Simulating the communication withZ. All input data received
fromZ will be wrote to the input tape of A, and the output of A
is copied to the output tape of S as well. Moreover, S is able to
achieve all messages between A and Gatt .
Simulating four subroutines in π . See cases of simulator S con-
structions in Section 6.2.
Simulating corruptions of servers. This can be proved by dis-
cussing different cases of simulator S constructions in corrupting
different servers during job protocol. We can show the views of
A and S are indistinguishable for each case. Due to the space
limitation, we omit the proof here.
We have declared that the protocol π performed by a malicious,
adaptive adversary A and n servers P1, . . . ,Pn in the real world
generate identical-distribution transcripts with S and Fπ in the
ideal world. In other words, no PPT Z can distinguish whether
it contacts with the ideal world or the real world. S operates by
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running a simulated copy of A. For proving the computational
indistinguishability, we put all cases above together and analyze in
the following four aspects: input, output, intermediate messages
of servers in the view of S and A as well as corrupting method in
two worlds.
(1) Input: In all cases above, if a server is corrupt, during Gatt
computing, S is able to extract the real input by the trapdoor inside
the enclave program and sends to Fπ . Due to the fact that all
messages are transmitted over the secure channel in the ideal world
and the encryption scheme in the real world is semantically secure,
it is obvious that inputs of corrupt servers are the same under both
of these two worlds.
(2) Output: For all subroutines in π , if outputs of some corrupt
servers are generated by sensitive code computation (“Compute”, ·,⊥)
(e.g., v in job initialization or vj in job execution), the simulator
S will replace the message by (“Compute”, ·,outp), where outp is
generated by Fπ in the ideal world. This equivocation will generate
identical outputs as the ideal world.
(3) Intermediate messages: A copy of A is maintained inside the
S. Hence, all messages sent by A during protocol perform are
copied to the output tape of S, and messages received by A are
copied to the input tape of S as well. Therefore, both distributions
of messages received by A and sent from A in the real world are
identical to the ideal world.
(4) Parties Corruption: All communication between Z and A
are forwarded to S. If Z requires A to corrupt a server in the
real world, S will “corrupt” the corresponding server in the ideal
world and communicate with Fπ on behalf of the server. For all
corruptions in the real world, S can also realize them in the ideal
world.
Based on analyses above, we can conclude that the protocol π
UC-realizes Fπ in (FJD , FJ I , FJE , FRR )-hybrid model. 
D FORMAL PROOFS FOR VC3 ANDM2R
Some previous works such as VC3 [1] and M2R [2] are security
solutions based on distributed computing framework. However,
both of them only adopts heuristic security proof and semi-formal
reasoning [3], lacking formal proofs of security. In this section,
based on the formal model and ideal functionalities before, we give
formal proofs for these previous works.
Theorem 6. We denote the life-cycle of a job in VC3 as a proto-
col πVC3 = (πVC3JD , πVC3J I , πVC3JE , πVC3RR ). We say that if πVC3 UC-
realizes the ideal functionality Fπ if and only if VC3 has a secure
shuffling process.
Proof. We denote the job data-flow graphs formed by πVC3
as GVC3 = {GVC3I ,GVC3II }. By analyzing job performing in VC3,
we find two differences between πVC3 and the privacy-preserving
protocol constructed by ObliDC framework in this paper: (1) For the
subroutine πVC3JE in π
VC3, it does not consider the secure shuffle.
The adversary A can extract more information about the sensitive
data by traffic analysis. While other three subroutines are identical
to corresponding ones in π . (2) The size of messages in VC3 are
not identical at all. They lack some padding data, so the adversary
A may infer some privacy if it has some background knowledge.
Hence, GVC3II satisfies neither oblivious traffic direction nor obliv-
ious traffic size. Formally speaking, ∃GVC3s ⊆ GVC3II ,GVC3s is not
a complete bipartite graph. Moreover, in GVC3II = (VVC3II , EVC3II ),
∃e1, e2 ∈ EVC3II ,we1 , we2 , if we denote the size of transmitted
message by the weight of edge in the graph.
Straightforwardly, we research on the transmitted messages in
the shuffle process. During job execution in VC3, the system only
protects the confidentiality of data by encrypting message contents
and putting tasks execution in the isolated area, while it ignores
network-level access pattern. In the shuffle process, one mapper
may not send data blocks to all reducers, which makes GVC3s not a
complete bipartite graph. Furthermore, ∃vi ∈ Gs (X ),d−
GVC3s
(vi ) <
|Gs (Y )| and ∃vj ∈ Gs (Y ),d+
GVC3s
(vj ) < |Gs (X )|. One mapper gen-
erates output blocks less than |Gs (Y )| which results in one reducer
has less than |Gs (X )| input blocks. During S simulates operations
with Fπ in the ideal world, S will only choose less than |Gs (X )|
canonical data blocks for vj , if vj is honest; If vj is corrupt, S can
only extract less than |Gs (X )| data blocks from Gatt by the trap-
door within as well. In both of these cases, Fπ will not perform
and abort execution because it does not have enough input blocks.
The outp can be calculated only if Fπ has φ = |Gs (X )| data blocks.
For (2), in the ideal world, all messages are padded to the same
size C , while they can be any size less than C in the real world.
Therefore, it is obvious thatZ is able to distinguish the transcripts
from the real world and ideal world by the size of received messages
in them. According to the analysis above,Z has the capability to
tell whether it contacts with the real world or the ideal world with
non-negligible probability. 
Theorem 7. We denote the life-cycle of a job inM2R as a protocol
πM
2R = (πM2RJD , πM
2R
J I , π
M2R
JE , π
M2R
RR ). We say that πM
2R is able to
UC-realize the ideal functionality Fπ .
Proof. We denote the job data-flow graph formed by πM2R as
GM
2R = {GM2RI ,GM
2R
II }. In this security solution, all mappers’ out-
put blocks pass through several mixers, which randomly permutes
all received messages in the enclave. Combined with the formal
model before, we conclude that GM2RII is identical to the graph
formed by ObliDC framework. For each instance of πM2RJE executed
in the ideal world, S is able to achieve enough data blocks from the
real world and send to Fπ . It will not abort execution as in VC3.
In further, all messages transmitted in the network are encrypted
using a semantically secure encryption scheme. The plaintext is
padded with dummy data to the same size. Hence, the only infor-
mation A extracts from the ciphertext is the constant size C . If A
performs some active attacks, such as drop tuple attack and data
block misrouting attack, they will not help the adversary obtain
more information because both oblivious traffic direction and obliv-
ious traffic size are satisfied in GM2RII . According to analyses above,
the protocol πM2R can be perfectly simulated in the ideal world,
and none PPT Z can distinguish the ideal world and the real world.
Hence, we say that πM2R is secure in the UC framework. 
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